Does Personality get in the way of Incumbent & Entrant Behaviour? Experimental Research on Personality in the context of the Fudenberg-Tirole Taxonomy by Drozak, Wim
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1
 Statistics refer to the EU-27 member states.  
2
 Data retrieved online from Eurostat (2015). 
3
 For example, empirical studies by Dunne, Roberts, & Samuelson (1988), Geroski (1995), Dennis (1997), or Headd (2003).  
4
 Case example based on description by Pindyck (2013).  
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7
8
5
 Empirical efforts include, for example, studies by Cubbin & Domberger (1988), Siegfried & Evans (1994), or Thomas (1999). 
6
 The reference refers to an article by Grassegger & Krogerus (2016) in Das Magazin. 
7
 For example, based on 68 likes the model can predict a person’s skin colour (95% accuracy), sexual orientation (88% accuracy), 
or political party preference (85% accuracy). Furthermore, the model can predict the behaviour of a person better than a friend 
based on 70 likes, better than the person’s parents based on 150 likes, and, somewhat worryingly, better than oneself based 
on 300 likes.  
8
 According to Cambridge Analytica’s CEO, Alexander James Ashburner Nix (Grassegger & Krogerus, 2016). The total 
compensation amounted to 15 million US-Dollars. 
   
 
9
9
 Namely, the experimental designs reduced Incumbent decisions to a selection of strategies based on a payoff matrix, which 
compressed the two- or even three-stage model into a single strategy choice (e.g., Brandts, Cabrales, & Charness, 2007). 
 10
10
 The study did find, however, a significant effect of two MBTI dimensions. Namely, low scores on the Sense-Intuition scale and 
high scores on the Think-Feel scale are more likely to enter the market and open a restaurant. 
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𝑝
11
 For a detailed review and discussion of predation please refer to Wilson (1992). 
 12
12
 The Cournot model was developed by A. A. Cournot and represents a market where firms compete on the output they produce, 
where overall market output defines the market price (Cournot, 1838). Accordingly, the respective reaction functions, i.e., a 
function for a firm’s own output dependent on the output of the competitor’s output, are downward sloping.  
   
 13
13
 Sunk costs defined as being committed before the production period takes place (Ware, 1984). 
   
 
 14
14
 A relatively recent example in an oligopoly market is the telecommunications market in Germany in 2014. After the takeover of 
fourth largest player E-Plus by its rival Telefonica (third largest player). The European Commission imposed a condition of 
approval, insisting that Telefonica rents out up to 30 percent of its network capacity and divests some of its frequency spectrums 
to allow potential of new operators in the future (Bartunek & Wolde, 2014).  
   
15
15
 The terminology applied by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) refers to ‘underinvest’ or ‘overinvest’. Other papers discussing strategic 
Incumbent behaviour equivalently use ‘refrain from investment’ or ‘make investment’, respectively (e.g., Besanko, Dranove, 
Schaefer, & Shanley, 2010). These terms are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.  
 16
17
𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡 = ∞
16
 The contrary behaviour of underinvesting in the face of a tough investment is the submissive underdog strategy, accepting to 
follow rather than lead and avoid conflict (Besanko et al., 2010). 
17
 Their model further assumed a duopoly with differentiated products, old customers to attrite, and new customers to bear diverse 
product preferences,  
   
𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 < 𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 = 𝑝𝑚
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18
 Static in the context of pricing refers to a non-changing, long-term price-level setting. Contrarily, dynamic pricing refers to 
continuously adjusting price levels as a response to change in endogenous or exogenous conditions.   
19
 Excess capacity data was only available for 26 of the 37 industries, which was the second study focus (next to limit pricing). 
20
 Survey recipients were members of the Product Development and Management Association (PDMA) and the American 
Marketing Association (AMA), business titles including Product Manager, Brand Manager, Director of Product Management, or 
Vice President Marketing (Smiley, 1988). 
21
 Alternative deterrence strategies included excess capacity, advertising, R&D-patenting, reputation, learning, profit hiding, and 
niche filling.  
22
 For new products 44% (35%) of respondents reported to ‘never’ use static (dynamic) limit pricing, while 34% (33%) reported to 
‘never-occasionally’ use it. For existing products 25% (27%) of participants reported to ‘never’ use it, while 32% (32%) reported 
to ‘never-occasionally’ apply it. 
23
 Alternative ‘strategic variables’ were comprehensive patenting, R&D, advertising, capacity creation, pricing policy, assured raw 
materials, selling network, and agreement with competitors.  
   
24
25
24
 Some firms reported, although being aware of setting ‘correct’ prices from a long-term perspective, that they were too occupied 
with day-to-day competition than aiming pricing at potential new competition. Also, low prices would be interpreted as a sign of 
competition and low costs, not necessarily the desired message they wanted to emit to current competitors (Singh et al., 1998). 
25
 In a large number of cases, results do not support limit pricing in the asymmetric information setting, as Incumbents raise prices 
when costs are low.  
 
   
26
26
 While Smiley (1988) focused on entry deterrence strategies explicitly, Singh et al. (1998) investigated strategic variables for 
competition in a broader sense (in oligopolies). Furthermore, Smiley inquired in his survey about frequencies of utilization, while 
Singh et al. used a dichotomous ‘high priority’ vs. ‘not high priority’ as their option space. As visible from , the 
available Incumbent actions or strategies are not entirely coinciding.  
 ~
   
27
27
 This is supported by some observations where Incumbents that did not pre-capture the market, dominated it nonetheless. 
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29
28
 The number of new firms divided by the total number of Incumbent and Entrant firms producing that year (Geroski, 1995). 
29
 Gross sales by Entrants divided by the total industry sales Geroski (1995). 
 30
30
 For each treatment a randomly allocated ideal number of N* market participants was selected (payoffs for participants entering 
the market depended on the respective number of participants entering the market and N*, making a net loss if more entered, 
and a net win if less entered). 
   
  
31
32
31
 In brief: the multi-arm bandit problem refers to slot machines (multi referring to several machines). While each of these ‘arms’ 
yields different rewards and the decision-maker sequentially plays any of the N arms, the decision-maker benefits from 
spreading his first few pulls to learn about the respective payoffs.   
32
 I.e., a non-monetary or non-material satisfaction that accompany an economic activity. 
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33
 One of the most popular economic behaviour theories describing how individuals make economic decisions including risks. 
Specifically, expected values of losses and wins are treated differently.  
34
 The dictator game is a two-player game. The ‘dictator’ or ‘allocator’ determines how to split the endowment (mostly a cash 
value) between him and the ‘recipient’. The role of the recipient is completely passive.  
35
 The ultimatum game is a two-player game, where the ‘proposer’ can make an offer of how to split the endowment (mostly a 
cash value) between him and the ‘responder’. If the responder accepts, both receive the endowment according to the proposed 
split. However, if the recipient does not accept the offer, both get nothing. 
 36
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39
36
 For a brief review and discussion of popular personality frameworks and their applicability please refer to ..  
37
 The 16PF framework identified 16 distinct personality dimensions, which are sometimes summarised by five global factors. The 
16 dimensions include: A warmth, B reasoning, C emotional stability, E dominance, F liveliness, G rule-consciousness, H social 
boldness, I sensitivity, L vigilance, M abstractedness, N privateness, O apprehension, Q1 openness-to-change, Q2 self-reliance, 
Q3 perfectionism, & Q4 tension Catell (1973). 
38
 The Behavioral Activation System (BAS) is one of two systems developed by Gray (1987), which is activated by stimuli of 
reward (composed of the three sub-scales BAS drive, BAS fun seeking, & BAS reward responsiveness). The opposite BIS scale 
(behavioural inhibition system), is related to anxiety and being concerned with preventing or stopping punishment. 
39
 A review of the two five-factor personality models, the Five-Factor-Model (FFM) and the Big-Five, is included in  
   
40
40
 The HEXACO model is comprised of six dimensions, namely Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness-to-Experience. 
  
41
42
41
 The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a two-player game, where both players simultaneously select between a ‘cooperating’ 
and ‘betraying’ strategy. It is based on the story of two prisoners, who were arrested for a crime, yet, the police cannot prove it. 
If both stay quiet (i.e. cooperate), both get a minimal jail time. However, if one betrays the other, he gets off without any jail time 
while the other has to serve a severe time. If both betray each other, both serve severe times. While the magnitudes of respective 
jail times (or returns) might differ, the game always yields one Nash equilibrium, that is, when both select the betraying strategy. 
42
 The LoC construct refers to the individual’s generalised belief in internal versus external control of reinforcements (Rotter, 1966). 
Those believing in external control believe that the events in their life occur due to uncontrollable forces, i.e., their goals depend 
on luck, chance, and powerful persons or organisations. They do not believe that they can control their lives by their actions or 
efforts. Internals, on the other hand, see themselves as active agents, who can influence the outcome of their goal achievements 
by their actions and efforts (Boone et al. (1999a).   
   
43
43
 The presence of market entry threat is very dependent on the respective industry. Capital-heavy, branding-focussed or 
economies-of-scale-reliable industries typically experience threat of market entry less often than the respective counter-poles.  
 44
 
44
 The differentiation between non-extroverts and introverts could potentially be of relevance, as Ben-Ner and Kramer (2011) 
reported non-linear relationships between personality traits and DG giving. 
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45
 Moore and Cain's (2007) experiment i) administered a mini-quiz between each round and provided direct feedback of one’s 
performance on the blackboard, which could have driven the attention to relative performance. Also, ii) their study used groups 
of seven, whereas Bolger et al. (2008) used larger groups (more than twice the size) and iii) overplacement and overestimation 
are not measured in the same way in both study. Most importantly, Bolger et al. (2008) use decision makers as their proxy, not 
actual entry decisions (in the experiment by Moore & Cain).  
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 46
46
 Except for the study by Bergstrom et al. (2016), which observed that male participants in the Incumbent role used inflated 
confidence reports to deter potential entry.  
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47
 See  for a detailed definition of conflict.  
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49
48
 The instruments to assess conflict styles include the Hall Conflict Management Survey/CMS (Hall, 1969) Shockley-
Zalabak(1988), Rahim Organisational Conflict Inventory/ROCI-II (Rahim, 1983) Weider-Hatfield(1988), Putnam-Wilson 
Organisational Conflict Instrument/OCCI (Putnam & Wilson, 1982; Wilson & Waltman, 1988), Thomas-Kilmann MODE Survey 
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1974), Rosenthal–Hautaluoma Instrument (Rosenthal, 1983), Lawrence-Lorsch Instrument (Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1969) and Conflict Management Message Style/CMMS (Ross and DeWine, 1988). 
49
 The conflict styles defined by Putnam and Wilson (1982) are non-confrontational, solution-oriented, and control.  
  
50
51
50
 Composed of four dimensions: orientation, perception, decision-making, and approach. Typically administered by and known 
as the Myers-Briggs type indicator/MBTI (Myers, 1962). 
51
 Murray (1938) distinguished more than 25 different ‘psychogenic’ needs, where the overarching needs were: ambition, 
materialistic, power, status defense, affection, and information.  
   
52
53 54
 
 
 
 
52
 The five personality factors are: extraversion, openness-to-experience, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism.  
53
 In 1938, H. A. Murray published “Explorations in personality” Murray (1938) describing personality in the form of needs. A list 
of these needs can be found in  in .  
54
 Except for selective conclusions, the study conducted by K. W. Terhune (1970) was not available. 
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56
55
 As described by Murray (1938) and Buss & Perry (1992). 
56
 As described by Catell (1973, 1957). 
 57
58
59
59
57
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007), Graziano & Eisenberg (1997), Barrick & Mount (1991), and Moberg (2001). 
58
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007) and Ashton & Lee (2005). 
59
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007) and Moberg (2001). 
   
 
60
60
 The rationale for focussing on duopolies with upward-sloping reaction functions (typically represented by price setting 
competition) has several reasons. First, incorporating downward-sloping markets to this research project would imply going 
beyond the scope of a dissertation thesis and/or an experimental study. Second, the developed propositions are especially 
intriguing in the downward-sloping markets, since conflict- or harmony-seeking personality dimensions are hypothesised to 
affect behaviour so that Incumbent firms deviate from theoretical frameworks or rationally ideal behaviours. Third, including both 
types of competitions in the experimental study would i) either imply subjects to compete in both types of markets (which, given 
the limited exposure to microeconomics and/or game theoretical settings, would risk the overall comprehension), or ii) increase 
the participant size by a factor of two (which would be difficult given this study’s budget constraints).  
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61
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007) and Ashton & Lee (2005). 
  
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 < 𝑝𝑚
𝑥
   
 
  
𝑥 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐸(𝑥, 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡) 𝐸(𝑥, 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡) = {0,1}
62
 
62
 I.e., paired participants in one market entry game. 
   
Domain Propositions  & Supporting Hypotheses
Incumbent P1 Conflict-seeking personality traits hinder Incumbents to select the best available strategy when the 
behaviour objective is to allow market entry and reinforce their selection of the best available strategy when
the objective is to deter entry.
H1.1: Aggression & dominance endorse 'theory-deviating'
a
 decisions when facing a tough  investment 
opportunity and allowing market entry is the underlying objective.
H1.2: Aggression & dominance endorse 'theory-deviating'
a
 decisions when facing a soft  investment 
opportunity and allowing market entry is the underlying objective.
H1.3: Aggression & dominance affirm 'theory-consistent'
a
 decisions when facing a tough  investment 
opportunity and detering market entry is the underlying objective.
H1.4: Aggression & dominance affirm 'theory-consistent'
a
 decisions when facing a soft  investment 
opportunity  and detering market entry is the underlying objective.
P2 Harmony-seeking personality traits hinder Incumbents to select the best available strategy when the 
objective is to deter market entry and reinforce their selection of the best available strategy when
the objective is to allow entry.
H2.1: Honesty-humility & agreeableness endorse 'theory-deviating'
a
 decisions when facing a tough  investment 
opportunity and detering market entry is the underlying objective.
H2.2: Honesty-humility & agreeableness endorse 'theory-deviating'
a
 decisions when facing a soft  investment
opportunity and detering market entry is the underlying objective.
H2.3: Honesty-humility & agreeableness affirm 'theory-consistent'
a
 decisions when facing a tough  investment 
opportunity and allowing market entry is the underlying objective.
H2.4: Honesty-humility & agreeableness affirm 'theory-consistent'
a
 decisions when facing a soft  investment 
opportunity and allowing market entry is the underlying objective.
P3 Strongly pronounced emotionality sub-traits impact the magnitude of the Incumbents’ investment 
decisions positively in the context of potential market entry.
H3.1: Dependence reinforces 'theory-consistent'
a
 investing behaviour when the decision maker is dependent 
on the opponent to enter the market (i.e., allowing market entry is the underlying objective).
H3.2: Fearfulness amplifies 'theory-consistent'
a
 investing behaviour as the decision maker fears standard 
behaviour might not be enough (to allow or deter market entry).
Entrant P4 Signalling setting: Beyond the Incumbent’s signalling, conflict-seeking personality traits drive market  
behaviour entry positively when facing remaining uncertainty.  
H4.1: The opponent's signal (i.e., price in pre-entry period) impacts market entry decisions negatively. 
H4.2: Aggression & dominance impact the market entry decision positively.
H4.3: Honesty-humility & agreeableness have no impact on the entry decision.
P5 Signalling setting: Beyond the Incumbent’s signalling, action-seeking personality traits drive market 
entry positively when facing remaining uncertainty.
H5.1: The opponent's signal (i.e., price in pre-entry period) impacts market entry decisions negatively. 
H5.2: Openness-to-experience & extraversion impact the market entry decision positively.
H5.3: Honesty-humility & agreeableness have no impact on the entry decision.
P6 Complete information setting: Despite full awareness of the investment implications, action-seeking 
personality traits drive entry positively, potentially hindering them to select the best available strategy.
H6.1: The preceding investment (i.e., capacity shift) impacts market entry decisions positively.
H6.2: Openness-to-experience & extraversion impact market entry decisions positively.
H6.3: Entries: Openness-to-experience & extraversion drive 'NE-irrational'
b
 market entry decisions positively.
a) Based on the market entry framework by Fudenberg & Tirole (1984)     
b) Assuming Nash-Equilibrium play and profits in post-entry period
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63
 Stachowiak (1973) authored his work in German. The corresponding original terms of the properties are: Abbildungsmerkmal, 
Verkürzungsmerkmal, and pragmatisches Merkmal. 
 
   
64
65
66
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗) =
(1 − 𝑏) + 𝑎
2
+
𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖
2𝑡
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, ∞)
- 
- 
- 
- 
64
 There are two types of product differentiation – horizontal and vertical product differentiation. The one referred to above and 
throughout this chapter is horizontal product differentiation. Effectively, customers would have product preferences even if they 
were equally priced (e.g., cars, real estate, watches, or famously Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi).  
65
 In the Hotelling model, both firms differentiate their products by their (store) location, whereas the customers incur transportation 
costs (reducing their utility the product). Customers are distributed evenly along a street (i.e. linear city) on the unit interval. 
Firms would simultaneously choose the location in period 1, followed by simultaneous price setting in period 2. Since the 
strategic choice of location is not relevant for this research, the focus will lie on the simultaneous price setting, whereas the 
predefined location represents the product differentiation. 
66
 For a more detailed derivation of the demand function please refer to other literature as, for example, Shum (2011). 
  
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
67
67
 The reaction function is derived by taking the derivative of the firm’s profit function and setting it equal to zero (while holding the 
other firms parameter variable constant). Solving for the firm’s own parameter variable yields the reaction function dependent 
on the other firm’s variable.  
   
𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝑁𝐸
𝑝𝑚 𝑝𝑁𝐸
 68
69
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗) =
1
2
+
𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖
2𝑡
,
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑝𝑗) = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖),
𝛼 𝛽 =
1
2𝑡
 
68
 Products are horizontally differentiated if customers have different preferences at equal price levels (e.g., Coca-Cola vs. Pepsi). 
Vertical product differentiation refers to an objective ranking of products, i.e., when products are priced equally, customers agree 
on which is the more preferred product (e.g., Economy vs. Business Class ticket).  
69
 The underlying rationale for setting the strategic location parameters equal is that none of the firms should have an unjustified 
advantage (as overall payoffs would be higher for one firm if a≠b). While it can be argued that the Incumbent firm typically has 
a strategic advantage (e.g., economies of scale or knowledge) and accordingly also yields higher profits, this could lead to 
undesired side effects in an experimental study (where roles are assigned by chance). Participants might feel treated unfairly 
and make decisions biased by these subjective perceptions. In our view, a symmetric setup eliminates these potential effects 
and thus simulates original conditions more realistically. 
   
𝑝𝐾
𝑚 >
𝑝1−𝐾
𝑁𝐸
(1 − 𝐾)
𝐴(𝐾)70 𝐾
𝑝𝑁𝐸
𝜕𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
∗
𝜕𝐾
 > 0, 
𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
∗  
𝜕𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
 > 0. 
𝐶
𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑚 > 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑁𝐸 𝐴(𝐶)
70
 Where the cost function 𝐴(𝐾) is convex, with 𝐴(1) = ∞.  
 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝐸 = 𝛾 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ;∞ ) + (1 − 𝛾) 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡)
71
𝛾 𝐾 𝐶
𝐾
𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐;∞)
𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐)
𝐾
𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐸 = (1 − 𝐾) 𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑡(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡),
𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐸 =  𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡)
𝐶
71
 Note that 𝑅𝑖(𝑝𝑖; 𝑝𝑗) represents the respective revenues given prices 𝑝𝑖 and 𝑝𝑗. Also, the superscript 𝐸 denotes the case of entry.  
   
Area Characteristic "Advertising and Goodwill" "Market Expansion"
Overall Market Number of firms Monopoly/Duopoly
E
Monopoly/Duopoly
E
Properties
Type of product Differentiated Differentiated
Competition Bertrand (Prices) Bertrand (Prices)
while
Costs Constant marginal; one-off fixed Constant marginal
Game Specifics Periods 1:  Inc. invests, Ent. observes 1:  Inc. invests, Ent. observes
- : Ent. makes entry decision - : Ent. makes entry decision
2: Inc & Ent. set prices
E
2: Inc & Ent. set prices
E
Period 2 Firms set one price (no discr.) Firms set one price (no discr.)
Investment makes Soft Soft 
Incumbent appear … (for play in period 2) (for play in period 2)
Incumbent Type Advertising Market Expansion (new market)
Investment
Description Reached fraction K of customers Shifted capacity C to new market
to represent monopoly in period 2 where Incumbent is the only firm
Period 2
Properties
Investment cost Costs A(K) are convex Costs A(C) are convex
where A(1)=∞
Resulting Profit Incumbent
Composition 
Period 2
Entrant
E
 In case of entry
NE
 Nash Equilibrium in Duopoly  
m
 Profit-maximising price in Monopoly * Combined, profit-maximising price
R ≙ Revenue (dependent on prices set)
𝑝𝑛𝑒𝑤
𝑚  >  𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑁𝐸𝑝𝐾
𝑚  >  𝑝(1−𝐾)
𝑁𝐸
𝜕𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
∗
𝜕𝐶
 > 0
𝜕𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
∗
𝜕𝐾
 > 0
 𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝑁𝐸  𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝑁𝐸
 𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 𝐸 = 𝐾 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ; ∞    
+ 1 − 𝐾  𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
 𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 𝐸 = 1 − 𝐾  𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑡(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡) 
 𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 𝐸 = 𝐶 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐    
+ 1 − 𝐶  𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
 𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 𝐸 = 𝑅𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑑 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐 ; 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡 ) 
  
- 
- 
- 
- 
𝑝𝑖 ∊  0.00, 9.00 
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖)
𝛼 𝛽
72
𝑝𝑁𝐸 < 𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑁𝐸 𝛼 𝛽
𝛼
𝛽
=
10
3
,
𝑝𝑁𝐸 = 3.33
𝑄(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐) = 𝜀 − 𝜆𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
72
 The firms in the duopoly face symmetric demand curves. Hence, taking the first derivatives of their profit functions and setting 
the result equal to 0 yields the respective reaction functions. Due to symmetry, the other firm’s price in the reaction function can 
be substituted with the own one, yielding the Nash equilibrium price 𝑝𝑁𝐸 =  
𝛼
𝛽
 . 
   
𝜀 𝜆
𝑝𝑚 =
𝜀
2𝜆
𝑝𝑚 =
10
𝜀
𝜆
=
20
1
.
𝐷𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐;∞)
2𝛼 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗
2𝛼 ≥ 𝜀 − 𝜆𝑝𝑖  , 2𝛼 ≥ 𝜀 ,
𝑝𝑖 = 0 2𝛼 = 𝜀
𝛼 < 𝜀 −  𝜆𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 ,
𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 9.00
𝛼
𝛽
=
10
3
𝜀
𝜆
=
20
1
10
33
<
𝜆
𝛽
 .
𝜆
𝛽
=
1
3
𝐴(𝐾)
𝐴(1) = ∞ 𝐴(𝐶)
𝐴(1) 𝐴(1)
𝐴(1)
𝐶 = 0
𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑁𝐸(𝐶 = 0) > 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝐶 = 1).
  𝐶
𝐴(𝐶) = 200𝐶2.
𝐴(𝐸)
𝐴(𝐸)
𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑁𝐸 (𝐶 = 0) < 𝐴(𝐸),
𝐶 = 0
𝐶𝑇 𝐶𝑇 = 20%
73
73
 Manageable implies that values were neither chosen to be very large nor very small (e.g., several decimal places). Furthermore, 
the factor ensured to align profits from both market entry games (with soft and tough investments respectively). 
Parameterisation Elements Defined Parameters
Market Dynamics Duopoly demand
Nash-Equilibrium
Monopoly profit
Profit-maximising price
Costs Incumbent investment
Entrant entry costs
Capacity threshold
Initial Values Incumbent budget
Entrant budget
Note: The respective unit for all parameters is 'points'  (except for Capacity)
𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖 ,𝑝𝑗) = 2 +  . (𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖 )
𝑝𝑁𝐸 =
10
3
𝑄(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐) =  0 − 2. 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑝𝑚 = 10
𝐴(𝐶) = 200 𝐶2
𝐴(𝐸) = 100
𝐶𝑇 = 20%
 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 0
 𝐸𝑛𝑡 = 100
   
 
- 
- 
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 Information Structure Information Availability
Market Dynamics Number of players Public
Duopoly demand Public
Monopoly demand Public
Price co-domain Public
No price discrimination Public
Incumbent objective
a
Private
Cost Structure Fixed costs Public
Unit costs Public
Initial Values Incumbent budget Private
Entrant budget Private
Game Structure Opponent identity Unknown
Number of periods Public
Decision time per period Public
Excehange rate of points Public
a) Whether the objective is to deter or allow market entry
   
Information Structure Information Availability
Period 1 Incumbent investment cost Public
Post Period 1 Incumbent investment decision Public
Entrant entry cost Private
Period 2 Entrant entry decision Public
Price setting Private
Information Structure Information Availability
Period 2 Price set Public
Profit duopoly Public
Profit monopoly Public
Overall Game Overall game profit (including Private
budget, invests, & potential fines)
 74
 
74
 Interestingly, the addition of a best-response function to the profit calculator lead to the observation that aggregate output 
increased to the Cournot level and decreased tacit collusion (Requate & Waichman, 2011). 
   
75
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 3 + 𝜈 ∑(𝛱𝑖
𝑔)+
4
𝑔=1
 ,       
𝜈 𝛱𝑖
𝑔 𝑔 𝑖 = {𝐼𝑛𝑐, 𝐸𝑛𝑡}
76
77
75
 As experiment duration was approximated at 75 minutes, the respective expected compensation was communicated at 12.50€ 
(which was slightly exceeded with an overall compensation average of 12.70€). 
76
 Note that (𝑥)+ = max {𝑥, 0}. 
77
 Participants are likely to differ in their natural objectives, i.e. altruistic individuals might favour market entry where subjects 
familiar with microeconomics might naturally conclude that deterring entry yields more favourable outcomes for themselves.  
 𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑𝐸
𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑𝐸 =
𝛱𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝑁𝐸
2
𝑔
𝛱𝑖
𝑔 =  𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖 + (1 − 𝐶𝑖)𝑅𝑖
𝑜𝑙𝑑(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) + 𝐶𝑖𝑅𝑖
𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑝𝑖) − 𝑓𝑖
𝜏 ,
𝐶𝐸𝑛𝑡 = 0 𝑓𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝜏 = 0 𝑓𝑖
𝜏(𝜏 ≠ 𝑑𝐸) = 078 𝑅𝑖
𝐴𝑖
79
 
80
78
 𝜏 represents the possible period 2 combinations (of Incumbent objective and Entrant decision), where 𝜏 ∈ {𝑎𝐸, 𝑎𝑆𝑂, 𝑑𝐸, 𝑑𝑆𝑂}. 
79
 As defined in previous sections, the remaining terms are:  𝑖 represents the respective budget of Incumbent or Entrant, 𝐶𝐼𝑛𝑐 the 
capacity shifted to the new market by the Incumbent, and 𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑𝐸 the Incumbent fine when the Entrant entered the market while 
entry was supposed to be deterred (accordingly in all other combinations 𝑓𝑖
⌐𝑑𝐸 = 0). 
80
 While this section applies and references underlying theory or methodology approaches – in line with the above section – it 
does not duplicate the respective descriptions (please refer to the above section for further details or references). 
   
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 - 
- 
- 
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81
82
𝑄𝑖
2(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) =
{
 
 
  
      0                   𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 > 𝑝𝑗 
𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑖
2
           𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗  
𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑖            𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 < 𝑝𝑗  }
 
 
 ,
𝑖 = {𝐼𝑛𝑐, 𝐸𝑛𝑡} 𝛼 𝛽
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗
81
 See chapter 4.1.2 for alternative examples of strategic complements. 
82
 Illustrative examples are electricity, petrol, or gold.  
   
 𝑐
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑐
83
𝑐𝑖 ∊ [𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] 𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑖
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
84
𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 ) = 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐) − 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐),
𝑝𝑚 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1
𝑝𝑚 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐) >
𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐) 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 ≠ 𝑝𝑚
𝑃(𝐸 = 1)
𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐸 = 𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 , 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 , 𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡) − 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 ≥ 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 > 𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 > 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐
85
𝑃(𝐸 = 1) ?̂?𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝜕𝑃(𝐸=1)
𝜕𝑐?̂?𝑛𝑐
< 0 .
83
 The profits are dependent on the unit costs, as 𝛱 = 𝑄 × (𝑃 − 𝑐). 
84
 Examples of initial entry costs are investments in machinery, production facilities or upfront marketing and advertising costs. 
85
 While the Incumbent could charge a price below her unit costs 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐, it would result in a negative profit for period 2. Since the 
game ends after period 2 and no reward is connected to having 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 > 0, pricing below cost would only decrease hitherto profits. 
Please note, while this holds true for period 2, it does not for period 1 (i.e., the loss from pricing below cost in period 1 can be 
offset by a potential reward (for inducing entry) or period 2 profits).  
 𝜕𝑃(𝐸 = 1)
𝜕𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 > 0 .
𝜕𝑝𝑚
𝜕𝑐
> 0
86
𝑝𝑚 > 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1  
𝜕𝑃(𝐸 = 1)
𝜕𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑐
< 0 .
𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 < 𝑝𝑚
86
 Setting a lower price – when deterring entry in order to make market entry appear less attractive – is the only logical deviation 
from 𝑝𝑚. By definition, setting the actual price 𝑝1 above the monopoly price, 𝑝𝑚 < 𝑝1, would also lead to foregoing some profit. 
   
87
𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐) + 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐 , 𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
2  ) .
𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1
87
 For simplicity reasons (pragmatism and reduction), we have excluded a discount factor for the profits from period 2. 
  
- 
- 
- 
Area Characteristic Limit Pricing Market Model
Overall Market Number of firms Monopoly/Duopoly
E
Properties
Type of product Undifferentiated (i.e. homogeneous)
Competition Bertrand (Prices)
Costs Constant unit costs
Game Specifics Periods 1:  Inumbent sets price, Entrant observes
- : Entrant makes entry decision
2: Incumbent & Entrant set prices
E
Period 2 Firms set prices simultaneously
Investment makes Tough
Incumbent appear … (for play in period 2)
Incumbent Type Signalling Unit Costs
Investment
Description Incumbent foregoes monopoly profit in
period 1 by setting p
1
< p
m 
Investment cost
Profit Composition Incumbent
Period 2
Entrant
where
E
 In case of entry  P
m
 Profit-maximising price in Monopoly
𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑐 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 =  𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 𝑝𝑚 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐 − 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 𝐸 = 𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 × (𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
2 − 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐)
𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 𝐸 = 𝑄𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 × (𝑝𝐸𝑛𝑡
2 − 𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡  
 
𝑐𝑖 ∈  𝑐𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  
   
88
𝑝𝑖 ∊  0.00,  .00 
89
90
𝑝𝑖 < 𝑝𝑗
𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑝𝑖  .
𝛼
91
𝛼 𝛽
 𝛼
𝛽
𝛼
= 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛼
𝛽
=
1
 
 .
𝑐𝑖 ∊ [𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] 𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑖
92
𝑐𝑖 𝑐𝑖 > 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑐𝑖 < 𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
2
 
    𝑎𝑛𝑑   
𝑐𝑖
𝑝𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 =
4
 
  .
𝛱𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑐𝑖)
𝑐𝑖
88
 Especially for participants from other fields of studies and are, thus, unfamiliar with market dynamics and/or functions in general. 
89
 While Abbink and Brandts (2005) use a bigger scale of [0,99], they do not allow for decimal places.  
90
 Note that in period 1 only the Incumbent is present in the market (monopoly). The demand function applies respectively as well. 
91
 Respectively at 𝑝𝑖 = 0 . 
92
 Significantly different profit-maximising prices 𝑝𝑚 for any unit cost 𝑐𝑖 as well as the possibility of negative profits for any 𝑐𝑖. 
 𝑐𝑖
93
𝑐𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗
94
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡 =
2
3
× 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 (𝑝𝑚, 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐) .
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝛱(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 ) < 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
93
 The respective unit cost levels have a relatively high impact on absolute profits. Thus, a secondary condition of 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐𝑗 being 
relatively similar was defined. This would ensure a more realistic market model (as firms cannot compete with each with 
homogenous products, while having significantly different unit costs [see Bertrand, 1883]).  
94
 The rationale for setting the costs equal is that i) the level of unit costs is not the focus of this research (rather the uncertainty 
of not knowing the opponent’s exact costs), as well as ii) the fact that this makes the following analyses easier. 
   
𝑐𝑖
𝑎 𝑐𝑖
𝑑
95
 
- 
- 
- 
95
 Microsoft Excel was used to generate the two unit cost levels (between 2.00 and 4.00). 
Parameterisation Elements Defined Parameters
Market Dynamics Demand for duopoly
and monopoly†
Profit
Price co-domain
Costs Unit costs
- Deter entry treatment
- Allow entry treatment
Entrant entry costs
- Deter entry treatment
- Allow entry treatment
Incumbent investment
Initial Values Incumbent budget
Entrant budget
- Deter entry treatment
- Allow entry treatment
†For monopoly set p j=∞       Note: The respective unit for all parameters is 'points'  (except for Capacity)
 𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝𝑗) × (𝑝𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖)
𝑝𝑖 ∈  0.00,  .00 
𝑐𝑖 ∈  2.00, 4.00 
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡 =
2
3
× 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 𝑝𝑚, 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐 .
𝐴𝐼𝑛𝑐(𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 ) = 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 𝑝𝑚 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐 − 𝛱𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑐
1 , 𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐
 𝐼𝑛𝑐 = 0
 𝐸𝑛𝑡 = 𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑 = 𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑑 = 2. 0
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑑 = 103
𝐴𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑎 = 91
 𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑑 = 103
 𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑎 = 91
𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑎 = 𝑐𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝑎 = 2.  
 Information Structure Information Availability
Market Dynamics Number of players Public
Market demand Public
Price co-domain Public
Incumbent objective
a
Private
Cost Structure Fixed costs
b
Public
Unit cost co-domain Public
Unit costs Private
Incumbent investment Private
Entry costs Private
Initial Values Incumbent budget Private
Entrant budget Private
Game Structure Opponent identity Unknown
Number of periods Public
Decision time per period Public
Excehange rate of points Public
a) Whether the objective is to deter or allow market entry
b) Other than Incumbent investment and Entrant entry costs
Information Structure Information Availability
Period 1 Incumbent investment cost
a
Private
Post Period 1 Incumbent price period 1 Public
Entrant entry cost Private
Period 2 Entrant entry decision Public
Price setting Private
a) Dependent on the respectve (private) unit costs and (public) price set
   
96
 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 3 + 𝜈 ∑(𝛱𝑖
𝑔)+
4
𝑔=1
 ,
𝜈 𝛱𝑖
𝑔 𝑔 𝑖 = {𝐼𝑛𝑐, 𝐸𝑛𝑡}97
96
 Informing participants of the opponent’s unit costs could significantly impact speculations for the second (tough) game played. 
97
 Note that (𝑥)+ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥, 0}. 
Information Structure Information Availability
Period 2 Price set Public
Profit period 2 Private
Overall Game Overall game profit (including Private
budget, invests, & potential fines)
 98
99
𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑𝐸 𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑑𝐸 =
1
3
× 𝛱𝑖(𝑝
𝑚, 𝑐𝑖)
𝑓𝐼𝑛𝑐
𝑎𝑆𝑂 =
1
3
× 𝛱𝑖(𝑝
𝑚, 𝑐𝑖) 𝑔
𝛱𝑖
𝑔 =  𝑖 − 𝐴𝑖 + 𝛱𝑖
1(𝑝𝑖
1, 𝑐𝑖) + 𝛱𝑖
2(𝑝𝑖
2, 𝑝𝑗
2, 𝑐𝑖) − 𝑓𝑖
𝜏 ,
𝑝𝑖
1 𝑝𝑖
2 𝛱𝐸𝑛𝑡
1 =
0 𝑓𝐸𝑛𝑡
𝜏 = 0 𝑓𝑖
𝜏(𝜏 ≠ {𝑑𝐸, 𝑎𝑆𝑂}) = 0100
98
 Participants are likely to differ in their natural objectives, i.e. altruistic individuals might favour market entry where subjects 
familiar with microeconomics might naturally conclude that deterring entry yields more favourable outcomes for themselves.  
99
 The reason is that we wanted to separate the strategies that simply maximise their profits in period 1 (without any concern for 
the imposed frame [allow vs. deter] from the ones that consciously adapt their behaviour.    
100
 𝜏 represents the possible period 2 combinations (of Incumbent objective and Entrant decision), where 𝜏 ∈ {𝑎𝐸, 𝑎𝑆𝑂, 𝑑𝐸, 𝑑𝑆𝑂}.  
   
 
101
101
 The Likert Scale is named after psychologist Rensis Likert (1903-1981) and was developed to measure attitudes or opinions 
by asking participants directly – offering them a (typically 5-point) frequency scale as the answer option space .  
 102
 
103
104
105
102
 Established personality tests (such as the ones applied in this thesis) generally account already for the mentioned 
disadvantages. Rational techniques (e.g., forced choice), demand reduction (e.g., anonymity and confidentiality) and covariate 
techniques addresses self-presentation. False-keying half of the items mitigates acquiescent responding, whereas extreme 
responding can be addressed by scale reduction or equal high and low answers (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). 
103
 A state represents a momentary emotional reaction to internal or external triggers, which dissolves after the emotional reaction 
passes and the ‘normal’ equilibrium resumes (Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994), A trait, on the other hand, refers to more stable 
and enduring dispositions of the individual (Allport & Odbert, 1936). Depending on the underlying inventory, aggression can be 
defined as either of the two, or not distinguish between the outlined differences.  
104
 Developed by Brian A. Gladue (1991) 
105
 Developed by Arnold H. Buss and Mark Perry (1992)  
   
106
 
106
 The original Aggression Questionnaire yielded in three independent samples goodness-of-fit of 0.76-0.81, whereas as the new 
12-item version yielded goodness-of-fit of 0.94 - confirmed by secondary analysis on independent data sets (Bryant & Smith, 
2001).   
 107
108 109
107
 The other dimensions are warmth, reasoning, emotional stability, liveliness, rule-consciousness, social boldness, sensitivity, 
vigilance, abstractedness, privateness, apprehension, openness to change, self-reliance, perfectionism, and tension. 
108
 Upon contacting PAN (Performance Assessment Network) and IPAT (Institute for Personality and Ability Testing), the agency 
licensed to sell the test materials for the 16PF, a representative informed me that the pricing per tested individual is 16.50 USD, 
or 3,300,- USD in total for this study. Although a 35% discount was offered when signing a ‘research agreement’, the agreement 
implied that a publication of the results has to be agreed by PAN, as it ‘allows them control over bad results being published 
without their knowledge/consent”. Signing the agreement and/or paying the respective fees was not feasible within the defined 
project budget.  
109
 The IPIP is a scientific collaboratory for the development of advanced measures of personality and other individual differences 
(http://ipip.ori.org). The site contains over 3000 items and 250 scales, replicating popular personality or individual differences 
testing inventories and making them accessible for researchers (without the related exorbitant costs in order to obtain the 
materials) in order to contribute to their further development and refinement Goldberg et al. (2006). 
   
 
110
111
112
110
 Namely extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and culture. 
111
 Namely extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness-to-experience. 
112
 Namely honesty-humility (H), emotionality (E), extraversion (X), agreeableness (A), conscientiousness (C), and openness to 
experience (O). 
HEXACO Personality Inventory       
Dimensions Sub-Dimensions (4 each)
Honesty-Humility Sincerity Fairness Greed Avoidance Modesty
Emotionality Fearfulness Anxiety Dependence Sentimentality
eXtraversion Social Self-Esteem Social Boldness Sociability Liveliness
Agreeableness (v Anger) Forgiveness Gentleness Flexibility Patience
Conscientiousness Organization Diligence Perfectionism Prudence
Openness to Experience Aesthetic Appreciation Inquisitiveness Creativity Unconventionality
  
113
114
113
 See  below and  for further visual documentation of the experiment setup. 
114
 The motivation to assess the personality dimensions before the market entry behaviour was based on the hypothesis that the 
personality assessment is more sensitive to prior (gaming) experience than the other way around. Prior research, however, 
does not show a consistent approach, as personality assessments were done  i) in separate sessions (Hilbig et al. (2015); 
Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe, and Smith (2002), ii) just before the gaming experience (Hilbig and Zettler (2009); Hirsh and Peterson 
(2009), as well as iii) just after the gaming (Lönnqvist et al. (2011); Brandstätter and Königstein (2001). 
   
 
115 116
117
 
115
 In German: Institut für Unternehmensführung (IBU) 
116
 The laboratory environment embodied the typical characteristics of laboratories, including a layout that controls the subjects’ 
views, convenience of imparting group and individual instructions, and monitoring of subject behaviour (Friedman & Sunder, 
1994). For a visual documentation please refer to . 
117
 Fortunately, the non-drawn role allocations belonged to Entrant roles, which enabled the fully use of the Incumbent data. That 
is, as the subject, when making the investment decision, had no prior interaction with the Entrant.  
 118
119
 
120
 
118
 For a discussion of potential impacts of characteristics of the subject pool, please refer to  in the following 
chapter. 
119
 Information within the invitation email have been kept to a minimum, only stating that participants for a game-theoretic study, 
lasting ~75 minutes, are wanted, along with the session dates and timings. Please refer to  for the exact email 
text that has been sent out. 
120
 The HEXACO-60 structure has one item for each dimension listed, before the second item of each dimension is listed, etc. In 
line with this logic, the 10 Assertiveness items have been included after each of these ‘cycles’, so that no dimension is inquired 
by consecutive items. 
   
 
  
121
121
 A focus variable is a variable whose effects are of primary interest to the experimenter (Friedman & Sunder, 1994). 
   
122
123
122
 The rationale behind this exclusion included the potential risk of subconsciously inducing the urge to ‘do something different 
this time’ if the very same situation followed with only the objective changing. Concretely, participants never played the same 
investment type (soft or tough) directly after each other.  
123
 While each sequence block has been conducted 3 times, one sequence combination has been conducted 4 times. 
  
 
 
Gender EducationLevel
SpecialisationField
124
PreviousPlayExperience Time2Decide
Gender (female)
Consequences
Experiment-
Experience
125
124
 The questionnaire collected all of the following variables: Gender, Age, EducationLevel, SpecialistationField, 
ExperimentExperience, ExperimentExperienceGame, KnowledgeEconomics, KnowledgeGameTheory, 
ExperimentObjective, PlatformHandling, UsedMaterials and UnderstoodConsequences. 
125
 Initially, the variable was collected as a categorical variable with multiple categories, i.e., ‘none’, ‘1-2, ‘3-5’, ‘6-9’, and  
‘above 9’. However, analysis results indicated no additional value from distinguishing between these values.   
   
 
aggression
dominance
𝑆̅𝑃
𝑃
𝑆̅𝑃 =
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 126
2pmSoftDeterInvest
127
127
2pmSoftAllowInvest
128
126
 Please note: For proposition P3, the variables have been transformed into semi-dichotomous (or semi-continuous) variables, 
since it is the ‘magnitude’ of the investment that is of central interest. Therefore, values below the threshold have been 
transformed to zero, while values above the threshold have been kept in their continuous form.  
127
 The threshold has been defined based on the expected profit in period 2 when assuming Nash Equilibrium play. Accordingly, 
investments above this value encouraged entry (from a rational, Nash Equilibrium perspective), while values below it deterred 
entry (again, from a rational, Nash Equilibrium play perspective). 
128
 Note: In the descriptive statistics analysis in the next section both variable scenarios are applied, the merged SoftEnt 
Decision as well as the distinguishing scenario with SoftEntDecisionDet and SoftEntDecisionAll.  
   
SoftEntDecision
SoftRatEntry
SoftRatStayOut
𝐶𝑇 = 20%
2pmToughDeterInvest
129
127
129
 The threshold has been defined to match the distribution from the soft investment settings (as values tended to be slightly 
higher, potentially due to the steeper investment-effect relationship). 
 2pmToughAllowInvest
ToughEntDecision
 
 
   
100 94 194
25 18 43
75 76 151
23.0 22.4 22.7
0 0 0
9 8 17
35 45 80
55 39 94
1 2 3
59 53 112
19 27 46
7 7 14
3 1 4
12 6 18
8 8 16
14 12 26
24 26 50
24 31 55
30 17 47
88 80 168
12 14 26
5 8 13
60 54 114
35 32 67
 130
130
 Initial results from multivariate regression analyses did not indicate any significant effects of these characteristics. Accordingly, 
these characteristics included as control variables in the following analyses. 
   
 
 194 2.48 0.66 1.17 1.67 2.50 3.33 4.42
194 2.20 1.05 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.67 5.33
194 2.76 0.78 1.00 1.67 2.67 4.00 5.00
194 2.28 0.96 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.67 6.00
194 2.67 0.79 1.00 1.67 2.67 3.67 5.33
194 3.84 0.50 2.20 3.20 3.90 4.50 4.90
194 3.24 0.63 1.70 2.40 3.20 4.00 5.00
194 3.18 0.84 1.33 2.00 3.00 4.33 5.00
194 3.23 1.05 1.00 2.00 3.33 4.67 5.00
194 2.95 0.98 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00
194 3.61 0.94 1.00 2.15 3.50 5.00 5.00
194 2.81 0.64 1.50 2.03 2.75 3.60 4.50
194 2.40 0.72 1.00 1.67 2.33 3.33 4.33
194 3.36 1.02 1.00 2.00 3.50 4.50 5.00
194 2.63 0.97 1.00 1.50 2.50 4.00 5.00
194 2.98 0.90 1.00 1.67 3.00 4.33 5.00
194 3.60 0.55 2.00 2.83 3.70 4.27 4.80
194 3.90 0.73 1.33 2.67 4.00 4.67 5.00
194 3.41 0.72 1.33 2.43 3.33 4.33 5.00
194 3.45 0.84 1.50 2.50 3.50 4.50 5.00
194 3.59 0.78 1.50 2.50 3.50 4.50 5.00
194 3.34 0.60 1.90 2.50 3.40 4.10 4.70
194 2.92 0.98 1.00 1.50 3.00 4.00 5.00
194 3.23 0.75 1.33 2.33 3.33 4.33 5.00
194 3.30 0.77 1.33 2.33 3.33 4.33 5.00
194 3.99 0.82 1.50 3.00 4.00 5.00 5.00
194 3.54 0.62 1.60 2.70 3.60 4.37 4.70
194 3.47 0.96 1.00 2.00 3.50 4.50 5.00
194 3.60 0.86 1.00 2.50 3.50 4.50 5.00
194 3.59 0.83 1.00 2.33 3.67 4.67 5.00
194 3.49 0.74 1.33 2.67 3.67 4.33 5.00
194 3.43 0.58 1.90 2.70 3.40 4.17 4.90
194 3.08 1.02 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.50 5.00
194 3.66 0.90 1.00 2.50 3.75 5.00 5.00
194 3.31 0.84 1.33 2.00 3.33 4.67 5.00
194 3.64 0.76 1.67 2.67 3.67 4.67 5.00
   
131
132
131
 Note: While both the 16-IPIP (assertiveness) and HEXACO frameworks use 5-point Likert-scales, the respective framing and/or 
phrasing of the statements might differ (as the inventories have different origins) and account for the recorded effect.  
132
 First developed by Tukey (1977), each boxplot consists of a box depicting the values of the 25th and 75th percentiles (or 1st and 
3rd quartiles), while the horizontal line within the box corresponds to the median. The height of the box is defined as the ‘inter 
quartile distance’ (Kohler & Kreuter, 2012). The outer lines illustrate the respective maximum values (excluding outliers, which 
are data points 1.5 times [of the inter quartile distance or box size] beyond the 25th or 75th percentiles). 
 ≤
≤ 
   
xx
xx
2.81 2.95 2.82
3.04 2.72
2.68 2.69 2.91
-0.32 -0.48 -0.37
0.41 0.42
-0.01 -0.14 -0.03
 133
134
133
 Most likely this is driven by a substantial sample size as well as the utilisation of established personality inventories.  
134
 Since the underlying variables are measured on an ordinal scale (i.e., Likert-scale), Spearman’s correlation has been applied. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) 2.48 0.66 -
(2) 3.84 0.50 -0.09 -
(3) 3.24 0.63 -0.35* -0.06 -
(4) 2.81 0.64 0.15 -0.31* 0.06 -
(5) 3.60 0.55 -0.23* 0.47* 0.04 -0.17 -
(6) 3.34 0.60 -0.52* -0.28* 0.38* -0.03 0.06 -
(7) 3.54 0.62 -0.15 0.34* 0.13 0.19* 0.17 -0.11 -
(8) 3.43 0.58 -0.11 0.16 0.2* -0.08 0.12 0.05 -0.01
   
135
136
 
135
 Specifically, the statements in the Aggression Questionnaire are relatively strong in their message (e.g., ‘I have hit someone’), 
while the statements in the 16-IPIP are more desirable (e.g., ‘I do not like to be pushed around’). 
136
 Fairness and creativity do not depict significant correlations (at 0.01 level) with one or two of their respective co-sub-traits. 
 (1) (2) (3)
(1) SoftDeterInvest 100 28.25 32.57 0.0 2.0 12.5 72.0 200.0
(2) SoftAllowInvest 100 34.59 34.35 0.0 3.9 20.0 80.4 200.0 0.15
(3) ToughDeterInvest 100 34.26 52.72 0.0 0.0 6.3 100.0 306.3 0.04 -0.02
(4) ToughAllowInvest 100 35.58 40.90 18.1 18.2 21.3 86.3 351.3 -0.07 -0.15 0.03
   
137
137
 While one subject reported to ‘not have fully understood the consequences of all his/her actions’ (allow), the other reported to 
have ‘little’ prior knowledge in economics and ‘not have used the profit calculator in any of the settings’. 
≤
≤ 
 138
139
138
 While one subject has ‘not understood one or two of the market settings’, the other subject reported to have used the profit 
calculator ‘only in one setting’.  
139
 The Pearson correlation coefficient between two binary variables is defined as the Phi coefficient.  
(1) (2) (1&2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) SoftEntDecisionDet 94 70 74.47 1 -
(2) SoftEntDecisionAll 94 80 85.11 1 0.23* -
(1&2) SoftEntDecision 188 150 79.79 1 -
(3) SoftRatEntry 150 108 72.00 1 -
(4) SoftRatStayOut 38 16 42.11 0 -
(5) ToughEntDecisionDet 94 54 57.45 1 0.14 0.00 -
(6) ToughEntDecisionAll 94 53 56.38 1 0.08 -0.13 0.15
(5&6) ToughEntDecision 188 107 56.91 1 0.02
   
140
140
 Except for the indirect effect of preceding Incumbent investments, which are likely to be affected by the defined setting. 
(1) SoftEntDecisionDet 0.11
(2) SoftEntDecisionAll 0.01
(3) ToughEntDecisionDet -0.35*
(4) ToughEntDecisionAll -0.17
  
 
   
 
log (0)
141
142
141
 Originally developed by Box and Cox (1964), the common application of the two-parameter transformation is a right-shift of the 
distribution by the value of 1 to enable a log-transformation (Hyndman, 2010). 
142
 Initially developed by Johnson (1949), this transformation has the two advantageous characteristics of behaving like a log-
transformation for larger values and mapping zero values to zero (Hyndman, 2010).  
 𝛽0 
𝛽𝑖 𝑖 = {1, … , 𝑛}
𝑦 = 1 𝐺(𝑧)
𝑧
𝑃(𝑦 = 1 𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2+ . . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) ,
   
𝑦 𝑥 𝐺(𝑧)
𝐺(𝑧) =
𝑒𝑧
1 + 𝑒𝑧
 . 
𝐺(𝑧)
𝐺(𝑧)
𝐺(𝑧) = ∫ 𝛷(𝑣)𝑑𝑣
𝑧
−∞
 ,
𝛷(𝑣)
143
 
143
 Which is defined as 𝛷(𝑣) = (√2𝜋)−1 𝑒
− 
𝑣2
2 . 
 144
145
146
147
144
 The component-plus-residual-plot draws the product of residuals and their linear component of the independent variable 
against the independent variable (Kohler & Kreuter, 2012). 
145
 The cpr-plots for the soft-deter and both tough investment settings are displayed in . The cpr-plots for the 
OLS-relevant, reduced data set (i.e., excluding outliers and non-investment values) are documented in . 
146
 The median spline is identical to a median-trace line, with the exception that it is composed of curves instead of lines (Kohler 
& Kreuter, 2012).  
147
 Excluding outliers and zero-values for the dependent variables.  
   
148
 
148
 Strongly pronounced personality dimensions were defined as being within the upper quartile of the participant sample. 
 149 150
149
 Akaike Information Criterion as developed by Akaike (1974). 
150
 Bayesian Information Criterion, often referred to as the Schwarz Criterion after Schwarz (1978). 
   
𝑁 = 38
 
𝑉𝐴𝑅(𝜖𝑗) = 𝜎
2 ,
𝑗
1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ ⌊
𝑛−1
2
⌋151
151
 Where ⌊x⌋ is the floor function of x, i.e., rounding down to the next natural number. 
 𝜒2
SoftDeterInvest+ SoftAllowInvest+
ToughDeterInvest+ ToughAllowInvest+
   
SoftDeterInvest+ SoftAllowInvest+
ToughDeterInvest+ ToughAllowInvest+
0.01 39.36
5.65** 21.46
0.13 40.00
12.88*** 46.95
χ
χ
  
152
153
𝑖 𝑥𝑖 𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑖
𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑖 =
1
1 − 𝑅𝑖
2 ,
𝑅𝑖
2
max (𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑖) 𝑖
154
155
152
 In this case: Stata (StatCorp LP; www.stata.com). 
153
 As can be seen in the correlation coefficient table in the appendix,  
154
 Since assertiveness does not comprise sub-dimensions, it was also included in the set of sub-dimensions. 
155
  reports the respective VIF-analysis results conducted with the initial personality scores (opposed to the transformed 
dichotomous variables). The VIF-analysis has also been run with the dichotomous personality variables. Since the respective 
VIF values were in general significantly lower, only the continuous personality variables are reported. 
   Alternatively, the VIF-analysis results could have been reported for each of the following regressions. Since the independent 
variables do not vary vastly between regressions (or use sub-sets of the extensive sub-dimension analysis on the right-hand 
side of Table 5.8), confirming high multicollinearity at this stage reduces reporting magnitudes on the following pages.   
   
 
0.421 1.727 0.499 1.996
0.445 1.801 0.592 2.451
0.386 1.629 0.656 2.907
0.326 1.483 0.663 2.968
0.298 1.425 0.636 2.745
0.435 1.770 0.611 2.571
0.415 1.709 0.535 2.150
0.370 1.587 0.420 1.725
0.396 1.655 0.440 1.785
0.221 1.283 0.502 2.007
0.118 1.134 0.489 1.956
0.500 1.999
0.464 1.866
0.582 2.392
0.522 2.093
0.441 1.788
0.522 2.092
0.492 1.967
0.645 2.817
0.542 2.185
0.588 2.427
0.582 2.392
0.621 2.638
0.573 2.344
0.606 2.535
0.509 2.038
0.420 1.725
0.455 1.834
0.513 2.053
0.608 2.550
0.406 1.684
0.354 1.548
1.801 2.968
  
156
157
158
156
 Recorded scores in the top quartile, i.e., above 75th percentile.  
157
 As described in , values close to 0 have are interpreted as underinvesting and included as ‘no-investment’ values. 
158
 In line with definitions outlined by Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group. 
   
159
aggression
𝛽 = −1.314
experiment 
experience
159
 As discussed in , theory-consistent refers to ‘not deviating from the hypothesised behaviour from the underlying 
pre-entry investment framework by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984)’. 
β p β p β p β p
Aggression -1.31** .03 -1.14** .05
Assertiveness -0.40 .49 -0.13 .82
Honesty-Humility -0.19 .77  0.37 .50
Emotionality -0.83 .19  0.25 .68
Extraversion -0.26 .64 -0.11 .83
Agreeableness -1.06 .16 -1.24** .04
Conscientiousness -0.49 .47 -0.49 .43
Openness-to-Experience -0.05 .92 -0.47 .34
Gender (female)  -0.83 .10 -0.78 .27   -0.14 .76 -0.52 .41
Consequences  -0.55 .46 -0.48 .59   -0.33 .60 -0.34 .66
Experiment experience   0.78* .08  0.87* .09    1.22*** .00  1.39*** .00
constant   0.63* .07  1.94*** .00   -0.47 .16  0.29 .59
99 99 99 99
0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11
χ - 10.92*** .00 - 6.93** .03
2pmSoftAllowInvest = 0 SoftAllowInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftAllowInvest = SoftAllowInvest SoftAllowInvest > 10 
2pmSoftDeterInvest = 0 SoftDeterInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftDeterInvest = SoftDeterInvest SoftDeterInvest > 10 
2pmSoftAllowInvest 2pmSoftDeterInvest
 aggression
𝛽 =
−1.141
𝛽 = −1.241
honesty-humility 𝛽 = 0.3  
   
160
161
162
𝛽 = 0.891
𝛽 = 21.810
160
 Please note that the number of events does not refer to the number of observations, but the total number of recorded events, 
i.e., values of 0 or 1 (accordingly, the lower of both counts is considered). 
161
 The area under curve (AUC) calculates the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve as an indicator for 
the goodness of fit (as well as potential overfit). The plotted ROC curve is a straight line if the model has no predictive ability 
and more bowed for high predictive power of the model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
162
 The average root mean-squared error (RMSE) for each of the 5-fold cross-validations is reported. The 5-fold cross-validation 
has been conducted 5 times for each of the models. Accordingly, the mean RMSE represents the average of 25 RMSE values. 
 β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
β
p
A
g
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
A
g
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
-0
.8
0
*
.1
0
-5
.7
0
.4
2
 0
.1
0
.8
3
1
7
.3
1
*
*
.0
3
V
e
r
b
a
l
 
A
g
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
A
n
g
e
r
H
o
s
t
i
l
i
t
y
A
s
s
e
r
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
H
o
n
e
s
t
y
-
H
u
m
i
l
i
t
y
S
i
n
c
e
r
i
t
y
F
a
i
r
n
e
s
s
G
r
e
e
d
 
A
v
o
i
d
e
n
c
e
-0
.7
6
.1
2
1
9
.0
6
*
*
.0
2
M
o
d
e
s
t
y
E
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
F
e
a
r
f
u
l
n
e
s
s
-0
.2
2
.6
3
-5
.1
0
.5
5
-0
.1
7
.7
3
-1
3
.7
7
*
.0
9
-0
.4
4
.3
5
-1
1
.5
2
.1
2
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 0
.2
5
.6
2
 0
.1
3
.9
9
 0
.4
3
.3
7
-4
.4
7
.5
9
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
-0
.1
3
.8
0
2
1
.8
1
*
*
.0
2
-0
.0
3
.9
5
1
5
.5
2
*
.0
9
-0
.8
7
.1
1
 7
.7
2
.5
2
S
e
n
t
i
m
e
n
t
a
l
i
t
y
-0
.8
9
*
.0
9
-9
.3
1
.3
4
-0
.9
1
*
.0
9
-4
.3
4
.6
3
 0
.0
1
.9
9
 2
.3
6
.7
5
 
 
E
x
t
r
a
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
S
e
l
f
-
E
s
t
e
e
m
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
B
o
l
d
n
e
s
s
S
o
c
i
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
L
i
v
e
l
i
n
e
s
s
A
g
r
e
e
a
b
l
e
n
e
s
s
F
o
r
g
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
G
e
n
t
l
e
n
e
s
s
F
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
P
a
t
i
e
n
c
e
C
o
n
s
c
i
e
n
t
i
o
u
s
n
e
s
s
O
r
g
a
n
i
s
a
t
i
o
n
D
i
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
 1
.1
0
*
*
.0
2
 3
.7
8
.5
7
P
e
r
f
e
c
t
i
o
n
i
s
m
P
r
u
d
e
n
c
e
O
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
-
t
o
-
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
A
e
s
t
h
e
t
i
c
 
A
p
p
r
e
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
C
r
e
a
t
i
v
i
t
y
U
n
c
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
(
f
e
m
a
l
e
)
 -
0
.8
3
 
.1
0
 9
.1
6
 
.2
7
 -
0
.5
4
.3
1
  
9
.9
7
 
.3
1
 -
0
.7
1
.1
9
  
5
.0
7
 
.5
8
-0
.1
4
.7
8
-1
2
.6
4
.2
0
 0
.0
8
 
.8
9
-1
0
.1
5
 
.3
0
 -
0
.4
8
.4
2
 -
6
.0
2
 
.5
7
C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
s
 -
0
.5
5
 
.4
6
-2
.1
4
 
.8
3
 -
0
.3
5
.6
6
 -
0
.1
1
 
.9
9
 -
0
.3
6
.6
6
 -
0
.2
8
 
.9
8
-0
.3
3
.6
0
3
3
.6
5
*
*
*
.0
0
-0
.3
8
 
.5
6
2
6
.2
7
*
*
 
.0
2
 -
0
.2
4
.7
1
 2
5
.5
0
*
*
 
.0
4
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
  
0
.7
8
*
.0
8
-9
.0
5
.2
5
  
0
.8
6
*
.0
7
 -
4
.9
6
.5
4
  
0
.8
8
*
.0
7
 -
8
.2
1
.2
5
 1
.2
2
*
*
*
.0
0
 -
2
.6
5
.7
5
 1
.3
0
*
*
*
.0
0
-2
.8
8
.7
5
  
1
.3
3
*
*
*
.0
0
 -
1
.4
2
.8
5
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
  
0
.6
3
*
.0
7
5
0
.1
1
*
*
*
.0
0
  
0
.8
0
*
.0
7
4
5
.6
9
*
*
*
.0
0
 1
.3
5
*
*
*
.0
1
4
2
.2
3
*
*
*
.0
0
-0
.4
7
.1
6
  
4
7
.6
6
*
*
*.
0
0
-0
.4
4
.2
7
5
2
.2
1
*
*
*
.0
0
-0
.8
7
*
.0
5
4
3
.5
0
*
*
*
.0
0
9
9
6
7
9
9
6
7
9
9
6
7
9
9
5
2
9
9
5
2
9
9
0
5
2
.0
0
-
0
.3
3
-
0
.1
3
-
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
1
-
0
.0
1
-
0
0
.0
0
-
0
.0
5
-
0
.1
5
-
0
.2
5
-
0
.1
7
-
0
.2
4
-
0
0
.3
0
0
.0
6
0
.0
0
0
.0
8
0
.0
5
0
.1
2
0
.1
6
0
.0
6
0
.1
2
0
.0
9
0
.1
2
0
.1
1
0
0
.2
1
-
2
7
.9
4
-
2
7
.3
2
-
2
5
.6
4
-
2
3
.6
4
-
2
3
.7
1
-
0
2
2
.4
2
χ
-
-
-
  
3
.3
7
.1
9
  
7
.3
2
*
*
.0
3
-
-
-
  
3
.5
3
.1
7
-
  
5
.8
7
*
.0
5
0
-
0
.6
7
-
0
.6
7
-
0
.7
1
-
0
.6
6
-
0
.7
1
-
0
.7
1
0
-
-
2
8
.0
9
-
2
9
.2
3
-
2
7
.9
8
-
2
4
.2
3
-
2
6
.8
4
-
0
2
5
.1
1
2
p
m
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
 
=
 0
 
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
 ≤
 1
0
2
p
m
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
 
=
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
 >
 1
0
;
2
p
m
S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
 =
 0
 
 S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
 ≤
 1
0
 &
 2
p
m
S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
 =
 S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
 w
h
en
 S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
 >
 1
0
 
2
p
m
S
o
f
t
D
e
t
e
r
I
n
v
e
s
t
2
p
m
S
o
f
t
A
l
l
o
w
I
n
v
e
s
t
   
β p β p β p β p
Aggression -0.41 .47  0.33 .62
Assertiveness -0.28 .58 -0.71 .18
Honesty-Humility -0.33 .55 -0.33 .57
Emotionality  0.60 .28 -0.53 .39
Extraversion  0.35 .46  0.18 .73
Agreeableness  0.80 .18  0.79 .19
Conscientiousness -0.21 .71  0.72 .24
Openness-to-Experience  0.30 .54  0.05 .92
Gender (female)   0.12 .80 -0.08 .90   -1.41** .01 -1.25* .06
Consequences   1.28 .12  1.17 .18    0.79 .32  0.86 .31
Experiment experience   0.12 .78  0.05 .91   -0.47 .29 -0.56 .23
constant  -0.02 .95 -0.15 .77    0.09 .79 -0.01 .99
99 99 99 99
0.02 0.07 0.06 0.10
χ -   5.63* .06 -   4.93* .08
2pmToughAllowInvest = 0 ToughAllowInvest ≤ 20 2pmToughAllowInvest = ToughAllowInvest ToughAllowInvest > 20 
2pmToughDeterInvest = 0 ToughDeterInvest ≤ 20 2pmToughDeterInvest = ToughDeterInvest ToughDeterInvest > 20 
2pmToughAllowInvest 2pmToughDeterInvest
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p𝑑𝑒𝑝;𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 p𝑑𝑒𝑝;𝑂𝐿𝑆 p𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟;𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 p𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟;𝑂𝐿𝑆
p𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟;𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 p𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑟;𝑂𝐿𝑆
forgiveness
social self-esteem 𝛽 = 23.412 liveliness 𝛽 = 24.982
forgiveness 𝛽 = −2 .1  
consequences
gender
163
 As before, the results include overfitting tests for the logistic regression (AUC for the ROC curve) and the OLS regression 
(mean RMSE via multiple 5-fold cross-validation), 
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164
 Three distinct variable combinations were applied and calculated. The reported coefficient (β) represents the average 
coefficient value, whereas the reported significance level represents the median value. The three predictor combinations include:  
i) the robustness-tested variable (RTV) + the control variables (CVs),  
ii) the conflict- and harmony-seeking variables + RTV + CVs, and  
iii) the overall-affecting variables (aggression, agreeableness, honesty-humility, extraversion) + RTV + CVs. 
165
 Unlike the logistic regression, the probit regression model uses a standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf). The 
logistic model assumes a cdf of the standard logistic distribution (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). 
 
166
 The tobit model is used to analyse the relationship between predictor variables and a non-negative positive DV, which’ 
distribution is roughly continuous over strictly positive values but zero a non-trivial fraction of the population (Wooldridge, 2015). 
Thus, as mentioned in the descriptive statistics analysis in , this model is applicable for the collected data. 
Computations included robust standard errors, as typically required in tobit models (Gujarati, 2011). 
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𝛽 = −1.241
Assertiveness – – – – – –
Aggression –** ** ** –** ** **
Agreeableness – – – –** *  **
Honesty-Humility – + –/+ + – –
Assertiveness – –
Aggression – +
Agreeableness + +
Honesty-Humility – –
– –
– –
   
assertiveness
167
167
 On the one hand, the 16-IPIP inventory represents a proxy scale recreating the 16PF by Catell (1957), and thus might not 
capture the traits facets as precisely as the comparatively more sound 16PF inventory. On the other hand, the associated 
questions to derive a respective score are comparatively positively phrased, which potentially results in distorted scores due to 
self-favouring biases during the evaluation (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).  
 p𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑡 p𝑡𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ
168
168
 I see two major pitfalls that may arise and distort any interpretability of the results. Firstly, each of the sub-dimensions is based 
on three or four items only. This implies a higher risk of limited robustness of the scores – especially when compared to the 10-
12 items for each of the main dimensions. Secondly, the high number of potential variables that may play a role in the sample 
(in combination with the first pitfall) potentially yield – although statistically significant – results that emerged by chance.  
   
  
 
169
170
171
169
 That is, with respect to the respective profit functions for both players, not the potential strategies that might be applied by the 
opponent to signal a specific behaviour in the next period. 
170
 Games with incomplete information are games where players do not have common knowledge about the game that is being 
played (Levin, 2002). Specifically, both competing firms (or participants) are not aware of the opponent’s unit costs. In a game 
of complete information, each player’s payoff function is common knowledge among all the players, as for example the prisoner’s 
dilemma (Gibbons, 1992). 
171
 Recorded scores in the top quartile, i.e., above 75th percentile.  
   
172
𝜒2 = 12.1 2
172
 Applying the rule of thumb by Vittinghoff & McCulloch (2007) of „5-9 events per predictor“ yields 9-16 variables for 81 events. 
      ToughEntDecision
β p β p β p
Foregone Profit    -0.02*** .00    -0.02*** .00
Unit Costs    -0.30 .89    -0.32 .88
Aggression    -0.18 .67
Assertiveness     0.41 .33
Honesty-Humility     0.44 .28
Emotionality     0.03 .95
Extraversion     1.09*** .01
Agreeableness     0.13 .75
Conscientiousness    -0.44 .28
Openness-to-Experience    -0.35 .36
Gender (female)    -0.08 .84    -0.18 .66    -0.21 .68
Consequences
Experiment experience    -0.49* .10    -0.66** .03    -0.72** .04
constant     0.55 .02     1.98 .71     1.82 .74
188 (81) 188 (81) 188 (81)
0.08 0.08 0.13
χ -    17.59*** .00    12.16*** .00
Foregone Profit 
Consequences
χ
 p𝑇𝐸2 p𝑇𝐸3
experiment experience
p𝑇𝐸1 p𝑇𝐸2 p𝑇𝐸3
   
β 0.010
173
174
175
NE-rational entries NE-rational 
stayouts
176
177
Gender Experiment experience
Incumbent Invest
173
 Recorded scores in the top quartile, i.e., above 75th percentile.  
174
 Note, the described function further depends on the associated entry costs. Given the entry costs of 100 points, entry is 
economically worthwhile for a capacity shift of 𝐶 > 19.2%.  
175
 Please note that strong emphasis lies on the assumption that both firms play according to Nash-Equilibrium play.   
176
 That is, a value of 1 indicating ‘NE-rationality’ and 0 indicating ‘NE-irrationality’. 
177
 Applying the rule of thumb by Vittinghoff & McCulloch (2007) of „5-9 events per predictor“ yields 3-6 variables for 33 events. 
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𝜒2 =  .932
178
openness-to-experience
β
emotionality
p𝑆𝐸3.4(𝜒
2
p𝑆𝐸3.8(𝜒
2
p𝑆𝐸3.9(𝜒
2
p𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡 p𝑜2𝑒𝑥
178
 While the quadratic relationship the investment (in points) has with the capacity shift (percentage) could explain these 
somewhat puzzling results, the logistic regression model  with capacity shift (instead of incumbent investment) 
as the nuisance variable, equally, did not yield any statistically significant results (β=0.748; p=0.384). 
 gender (female)
179
180
openness-to-experience β
openness-to-experience
χ
181
openness-to-experience  conscientiousness
182
openness-to-experience
179
 Since the NE-rationality depends on the incumbent investment the nuisance variable is not included in the models. 
180
 For detailed results of all models ( ) please refer to .  
181
 The rationale behind this stepwise approach of independently adding the personality variables lies in the fact that the number 
of events is very limited (42 events for 150 observations), which suggests a predictor count range of 4-8 variables. To avoid 
overfitting, my modelling approach aimed at the conservative lower end of this range.  
182
 All model combinations have been calculated for openness-to-experience. While all models confirmed the statistical 
significance of the negative effect of openness-to-experience at the 0.05-level, conscientiousness yielded the best 
overall model fit (𝜒2=5.152; p=0.076). Accordingly, the displayed relevant model ( ) represents the combination of 
openness-to-experience and conscientiousness.  
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conscientiousness
β
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185
183
 For a detailed documentation of the results ( ) please refer to . 
184
 Three distinct variable combinations have been applied and modelled. The reported coefficient (β) and reported significance 
levels represent the median value of the three alternative models. The three predictor combinations include:  
 i) only the robustness-tested variable (RTV) + nuisance variables (NVs) + control variables (CVs),  
 ii) the RTV + conflict- and action-seeking variables + NVs + CVs,  
 iii) the RTV + overall-affecting variables (emotionality, extraversion, conscientiousness, openness-to-experience) + NVs + CVs. 
185
 Due to the strictly dichotomous nature of the DV, a tobit model (as applied for the Incumbent behaviour) is not applicable. 
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openness-
to-experience 𝛽
openness-to-experience
p𝑖) p𝑖𝑖) p𝑖𝑖𝑖)
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p𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛. p𝑐.𝑖.
186
 Furthermore, as part of the, initial, stepwise regression approach in the previous sub-sub-section, openness-to-
experience has been modelled independently with each of the other main personality variables. Results for all eight models 
confirmed openness-to-experience as negatively affecting NE-rational entry decisions at the 0.1 significance level. 
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Incumbent Invest – *** *** *** +
Assertiveness + –
Aggression – +
Agreeableness + –
Honesty-Humility + +
Extraversion + *** *** ** –
Openness-to-Experience – + ** ** **
Emotionality + + ** ** **
Conscientiousness – –
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Aggression + +
Agreeableness – +
Honesty-Humility + +
Extraversion + +
Openness-to-Experience – *      * +
Emotionality + –
Conscientiousness + + **      *       **
–
–
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extraversion
openness-to-experience
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 Based on the studies by Ben-Ner et al. (2008), Lönnqvist et al. (2011), and Schmitt et al. (2008). 
   
openness-to-experience
emotionality
openness-to-experience
emotionality
188
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conscientiousness
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188
 Specifically, higher scoring emotionality individuals being paired by chance with Incumbents, who invest more and, accordingly, 
legitimise entry from a NE-rationality point of view. 
189
 The univariate analysis between the categorised Incumbent investment (above or below the encouragement threshold) and 
higher scoring Entrants on the emotionality dimension yielded a negative correlation (as hypothesised as a potential explanation) 
just above the 0.1 significance threshold (𝛽 = −0.119; p=0.103). 
190
 Out of the 79 investments above the encouragement threshold, i.e., encouraging market entry, a striking 77.2 percent of the 
Entrants decided to enter the market nonetheless.  
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191
 With the exception of the recently published restaurant-opening experimental study by Bergstrom et al. (2016), which did not 
find any significant support for the Big Five personality traits affecting entry decisions.  
192
 In the Entrant behaviour analysis extraversion, openness-to-experience, and conscientiousness yielded significant results. 
These dimensions are represented in both the HEXACO and Big Five inventories. The HEXACO framework differs from the Big 
Five by adding honesty-humility as a sixth factor and slightly alternating the underlying factors for agreeableness and 
emotionality (neuroticism). 
193
 The differences include sequential decision making instead of having the participants to choose a compressed strategy (from 
a payoff table) as well as the inclusion of a preceding Incumbent action. 
   
  
   
 
194
194
 While internal validity “refers to the ability to draw confident causal conclusions from one’s research”, external validity “refers 
to the ability to generalize from the research context to the settings that the research is intended to approximate” (Loewenstein, 
1999). 
 195
196
197
198
195
 The personality assessment was conducted at the very beginning of the experiment to minimise potential distortions of the 
results due to the experiment experience.  
196
 All participants were confronted with identical information sets and decisions to make. Potential influencing factors beyond the 
experimental design were accounted for in the form of statistical control variables (e.g., gender, education level, age, education 
field, or economic knowledge). 
197
 On a further note, several (widely accepted) publications in this research field equally relied on thoroughly pre-developed 
personality inventories (e.g., Brandstätter & Königstein, 2001; Hirsh & Peterson, 2009). 
198
 Specifically, the drastic complexity reduction of previous market entry games was undesirable for this experimental study. 
   
199
200
201
199
 For the logistic regression, a linear relationship is modelled between the independent variable and the log values of success 
(i.e., dependent variable equal to 1). 
200
 The DVs for both settings have been transformed using a log-function. Additionally, the respective functions defining the 
relationship of the investment magnitude with the alternative decision unit (ie.e., the price in the tough setting and shifted 
capacity in the soft setting) have been modelled as well. 
201
 For a broader discussion please refer to Davis & Holt (1993). 
 202
203
204
205
202
 Of the 194 participants, 89 percent represented students (i.e., participants in their Bachelor or Master studies). 
203
 For example, Burns (1985) compared results of professional and student wool buyers, finding that students were far more 
adept at maximising profits, as the aspect of quality (which the professionals focussed on) has not been included in the study.  
204
 For example, Brandts & Holt (1992), Brandts et al. (2007) or Mason & Nowell (1998). 
205
 Both, founders and non-founders, seemed to focus more on their own abilities than the abilities of the competition, as previously 
suggested by several other research efforts.  
   
206
206
 As evidenced by Porter (1979) and empirical findings on excess entry.  
 207
207
 Big data refers to “Computing (also with capital initials) data of a very large size, typically to the extent that its manipulation 
and management present significant logistical challenges; (also) the branch of computing involving such data” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2013). 
   
 208
209
210
210
211
212
210
208
 As described by Murray (1938) and Buss & Perry (1992). 
209
 As described by Catell (1973, 1957). 
210
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007) and Ashton & Lee (2005). 
211
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007) and Moberg (2001). 
212
 As described by Ashton & Lee (2007), Graziano & Eisenberg (1997), Barrick & Mount (1991), and Moberg (2001). 
   
210
213
214
214
213
 As described by Buss and Perry (1992). 
214
 As described by Lee and Ashton (2008). 
 215
215
215
215
215
 As described by Lee and Ashton (2008). 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
Deutschland (beide im Markt) befüllen
 Ergebnis entspricht 100% Kapazität
Nachfrage: Q
100%
 = 25 - 7.5*p1 + 7.5*p2
P1 = 6.00 Werte zwischen 0.00 und 9.00
P2 = 5.00 Werte zwischen 0.00 und 9.00
Q1100% = 17.50 P1100% = 105.00
Q2100% = 32.50 P2100% = 162.50
Deutschland (nur Monopolist) befüllen
 Ergebnis entspricht 100% Kapazität
Nachfrage: Q100% = 75 - 7.5*p
P1 = 4.00 Werte zwischen 0.00 und 9.00 
Q1100% = 45.00 P1100% = 180.00
Frankreich befüllen
 Ergebnis entspricht 100% Kapazität
Nachfrage: Q100% = 50 - 2.5*p
P1 = 6.00 Werte zwischen 0.00 und 9.00 
Q1100% = 35.00 P1100% = 210.00
Nur Monopolist im Markt
befüllen
Nachfrage Q = 500 - 100*p
c1 = 3.33  = [2.00 ; 4.00]
P1 = 4.00  = [0.00 ; 5.00]
Q1 = 100.00
Profit1 = 67.00
Beide im Markt:
befüllen
pA > pB : 0
Nachfrage QA = pA = pB : (500 - 100*p)/2
pA < pB : 500 - 100*p
c1 = 3.12  = [2.00 ; 4.00]
P1 = 3.00  = [0.00 ; 5.00]
c2 = 3.00  = [2.00 ; 4.00]
P2 = 4.00  = [0.00 ; 5.00]
Q1 = 200.0 Profit1 = -24.0
Q2 = 0.0 Profit2 = 0.0
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1)
(2) 0.74
(3) 0.73 0.43
(4) 0.76 0.36 0.45
(5) 0.66 0.28 0.37 0.47
(6) -0.09 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.31
(7) -0.35 -0.34 -0.29 -0.17 -0.20 -0.06
(8) -0.24 -0.28 -0.24 -0.08 -0.10 0.03 0.74
(9) -0.22 -0.24 -0.16 -0.03 -0.15 -0.02 0.70 0.33
(10) -0.22 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19 -0.14 -0.12 0.58 0.31 0.16
(11) -0.27 -0.20 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.11 0.55 0.29 0.12 0.28
(12) 0.15 -0.04 0.03 0.28 0.27 -0.31 0.06 -0.03 0.19 -0.01 0.02
(13) 0.11 -0.07 -0.01 0.22 0.21 -0.32 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.66
(14) 0.26 0.03 0.19 0.30 0.34 -0.18 -0.12 -0.17 0.06 -0.10 -0.12 0.67 0.29
(15) 0.03 -0.11 0.00 0.12 0.14 -0.23 0.17 0.09 0.26 0.03 0.08 0.72 0.38 0.33
(16) 0.02 -0.03 -0.10 0.12 0.11 -0.16 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.05 0.07 0.76 0.26 0.34 0.47
(17) -0.23 -0.10 -0.14 -0.13 -0.43 0.47 0.04 -0.01 0.19 0.02 -0.14 -0.17 -0.24 -0.20 -0.07
(18) -0.30 -0.12 -0.18 -0.22 -0.46 0.42 0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.15 -0.22 -0.22 -0.01
(19) -0.03 0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.25 0.55 -0.11 -0.05 0.07 -0.12 -0.25 -0.18 -0.19 -0.10 -0.14
(20) -0.12 -0.11 -0.13 -0.03 -0.15 0.11 0.00 -0.10 0.20 0.04 -0.17 0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.09
(21) -0.21 -0.16 -0.13 -0.09 -0.32 0.27 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.13 -0.01 -0.18 -0.19 -0.23 -0.10
(22) -0.52 -0.31 -0.46 -0.47 -0.25 -0.28 0.38 0.23 0.19 0.33 0.27 -0.03 -0.07 -0.09 0.00
(23) -0.32 -0.21 -0.25 -0.29 -0.22 -0.09 0.34 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.13 -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.10
(24) -0.36 -0.21 -0.33 -0.33 -0.12 -0.36 0.27 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.23 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.01
(25) -0.27 -0.13 -0.38 -0.17 -0.11 -0.29 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.12 0.11
(26) -0.58 -0.36 -0.36 -0.63 -0.31 -0.05 0.22 0.16 0.03 0.21 0.25 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.08
(27) -0.15 -0.17 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 0.34 0.13 0.05 0.26 -0.10 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.23
(28) -0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.14 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.14 -0.10 -0.06 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.19
(29) -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.34 0.12 0.03 0.27 -0.05 0.01 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.14
(30) -0.09 -0.17 -0.06 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.19 -0.08 0.11 0.17 -0.02 0.17 0.14
(31) -0.17 -0.19 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 0.20 0.09 -0.01 0.18 -0.05 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.21
(32) -0.11 -0.19 -0.04 -0.12 -0.04 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.20 0.01 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06
(33) 0.00 -0.08 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.13 -0.02 0.01
(34) -0.11 -0.10 0.02 -0.10 -0.17 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.02 -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 -0.10
(35) -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 0.01 0.17 0.22 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.02
(36) -0.06 -0.15 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.09 -0.13 -0.05 -0.10 -0.09
   
(16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35)
0.02
0.03 0.68
-0.07 0.76 0.38
0.19 0.65 0.23 0.34
-0.04 0.71 0.31 0.40 0.42
0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.12 0.15
-0.04 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.18 0.66
0.13 -0.06 -0.03 -0.20 0.04 0.06 0.80 0.38
0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 0.07 0.02 0.73 0.30 0.46
-0.03 0.14 0.19 -0.03 0.15 0.14 0.66 0.35 0.43 0.29
0.14 0.17 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.21 -0.03 0.03
0.07 0.13 0.25 0.08 0.01 0.04 -0.18 -0.16 -0.23 -0.04 -0.07 0.70
0.13 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.13 0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.69 0.39
0.16 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.16 -0.04 0.04 0.77 0.33 0.44
0.07 0.09 0.27 0.08 0.00 -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.17 -0.02 0.06 0.77 0.49 0.40 0.40
-0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.11 0.02 -0.06 0.10 -0.01 -0.12 0.05 0.00 0.02
0.11 0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.12 0.07 -0.01 0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.69
-0.07 0.15 0.12 0.19 -0.03 0.13 -0.04 0.06 -0.09 -0.13 0.04 0.08 -0.01 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.56 0.34
0.02 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.03 0.01 0.16 -0.03 -0.10 -0.03 0.03 -0.06 0.70 0.32 0.15
-0.11 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.21 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.66 0.24 0.21 0.30
 
   
 2pmSoftAllowInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Aggression
Physical Aggression -1.05** .04 -5.26 .57
Verbal Aggression  0.38 .50  6.65 .42
Anger  0.65 .28 -12.54 .15
Hostility  0.06 .90 -1.43 .84
Assertiveness
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity  0.31 .60 -5.90 .43
Fairness -0.39 .44 13.17 .13
Greed Avoidence -0.66 .19 24.23*** .00
Modesty  0.39 .45  7.70 .30
Emotionality
Fearfulness -0.22 .63 -5.10 .55
Anxiety  0.25 .62  0.13 .99
Dependence -0.13 .80 21.81** .02
Sentimentality -0.89* .09 -9.31 .34
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Patience
Conscientiousness
Organisation
Diligence
Perfectionism
Prudence
Openness-to-Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
Inquisitiveness
Creativity
Unconventionality
Gender (female)  -0.83 .10  9.16 .27  -1.09* .07  11.77 .24  -0.72 .20   7.33 .34  -0.54 .31   9.97 .31
Consequences  -0.55 .46 -2.14 .83  -0.43 .56   0.63 .96  -0.57 .45  -3.89 .66  -0.35 .66  -0.11 .99
Experiment experience   0.78* .08 -9.05 .25   0.74 .12  -8.29 .31   0.78* .09  -9.00 .19   0.86* .07  -4.96 .54
constant   0.63* .07 50.11*** .00   0.72 .14 52.34*** .00   0.79* .07 38.33*** .00   0.80* .07 45.69*** .00
99 67 99 67 99 67 99 67
- 0.33 - 0.39 - 0.01 - 0.13
- 0.05 - 0.10 - 0.24 - 0.15
0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.01 0.08 0.15 0.08 0.05
- 27.94 - 28.06 - 25.73 - 27.32
χ - -   5.44* .07 -   2.66 .26 -   3.37 .19 -
0.67 - 0.69 - 0.69 - 0.67 -
- 28.09 - 29.87 - 15.87 - 29.23
2pmSoftAllowInvest = 0 SoftAllowInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftAllowInvest = SoftAllowInvest SoftAllowInvest > 10
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 AUC for the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve (ROC). 
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 Note: The 5-fold cross-validation has been conducted 5 times (to ensure random division of the sample). Equivalently, the 
reported average RMSEs represent the average of all 25 RMSE values. 
2pmSoftAllowInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
-0.80* .10 -5.70 .42
-0.76 .12 19.06** .02
-0.03 .95 15.52* .09
-0.91* .09 -4.34 .63
 0.29 .55 -0.30 .97
 0.74 .17 -1.40 .85
 0.14 .77 -1.11 .90
-0.36 .46  0.06 .99
 0.55 .29  6.10 .42
-0.44 .40  2.11 .80
-0.04 .95  2.78 .70
-0.03 .96 -4.64 .54
-0.29 .60 -5.88 .55
 0.02 .96  2.84 .70
 0.11 .84 -7.03 .35
 0.20 .72 17.70 .05
-0.76 .16  6.65 .49
 0.70 .21  0.21 .98
-0.29 .56  7.52 .36
 0.39 .44 -2.04 .79
-0.90* .09  9.53 .28  -0.68 .22   8.38 .35 -0.84 .14  7.42 .42  0.72 .19  6.29 .44  -0.71 .19   5.07 .58
-0.35 .65 -2.50 .81  -0.67 .38  -1.40 .87 -0.55 .47  4.58 .68 -0.64 .38  0.50 .96  -0.36 .66  -0.28 .98
 0.89* .05 -9.03 .27   0.80* .09  -8.01 .32  0.78* .08  -9.82 .22  0.64 .17 -9.72 .24   0.88* .07  -8.21 .25
 0.37 .45 51.05*** .00   0.60 .17 47.29*** .00  0.61 .17 46.15*** .00  0.70* .10 47.51*** .00  1.35*** .01 42.23*** .00
99 67 99 67 99 67 99 67 99 67
- 0.82 - 0.60 - 0.26 - 0.45 - 0.00
- 0.05 - 0.07 - 0.12 - 0.08 - 0.25
0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.09 -0.03 0.12 0.16
- 28.86 - 28.61 - 27.75 - 28.37 - 25.64
  2.92 .23 -   1.53 .47 -   0.31 .86 -   3.61 .16 -   7.32** .03 -
0.69 - 0.67 - 0.67 - 0.71 - 0.71 -
- 31.26 - 29.44 - 29.12 - 30.29 - 27.98
2pmSoftAllowInvest = 0 SoftAllowInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftAllowInvest = SoftAllowInvest SoftAllowInvest > 10
 2pmSoftDeterInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Aggression
Physical Aggression  0.01 .99 18.07** .03
Verbal Aggression -0.66 .21  6.54 .53
Anger -0.12 .83 -13.16 .12
Hostility  0.80 .10 -1.24 .86
Assertiveness
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity -0.16 .76 -8.13 .38
Fairness -0.17 .73 -9.10 .18
Greed Avoidence  0.05 .92  9.12 .28
Modesty -0.51 .28 -5.02 .56
Emotionality
Fearfulness -0.17 .73 -13.77* .09
Anxiety  0.43 .37 -4.47 .59
Dependence -0.87 .11  7.72 .52
Sentimentality  0.01 .99  2.36 .75
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Patience
Conscientiousness
Organisation
Diligence
Perfectionism
Prudence
Openness-to-Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
Inquisitiveness
Creativity
Unconventionality
Gender (female) -0.14 .78 -12.64 .20  -0.13 .82 -4.80 .65  -0.08 .89  -9.86 .35  0.08 .89 -10.15 .30
Consequences -0.33 .60 33.65*** .00  -0.43 .48 32.12*** .00  -0.38 .56 30.00*** .00 -0.38 .56 26.27** .02
Experiment experience  1.22*** .00  -2.65 .75   1.23*** .01  -0.21 .98   1.26*** .00   0.26 .98  1.30*** .00 -2.88 .75
constant -0.47 .16   47.66***.00  -0.54 .19 42.40*** .00  -0.27 .50 48.08*** .00 -0.44 .27 52.21*** .00
99 4.74 99 67 99 67 99 3.31
- 0.01 - 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.01
- 0.17 - 0.30 - 0.24 - 0.24
0.00 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.12
- 23.64 - 22.73 - 23.62 - 23.71
χ - -   4.01 .13 -   1.44 .49 -   3.53 .17 -
0.66 - 0.70 - 0.67 - 0.71 -
- 24.23 - 25.62 - 26.30 - 26.84
2pmSoftDeterInvest = 0 SoftDeterInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftDeterInvest = SoftDeterInvest SoftDeterInvest > 10
   
2pmSoftDeterInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
 0.10 .83 17.31** .03
-0.44 .35 -11.52 .12
  
 0.24 .60  7.05 .35
 0.28 .54 -0.22 .97
-0.64 .17 11.63 .16
-0.36 .43 -9.83 .15
 0.62 .19 -2.51 .71
 0.02 .97  5.27 .51
-0.31 .53 -10.98 .23
-0.17 .74  6.66 .42
 0.07 .91 10.48 .21
 1.36*** .01  5.21 .48  1.10** .02  3.78 .57
-0.60 .27 -10.05 .15
-0.49 .41 -7.80 .38
-0.19 .73  8.61 .36
 0.32 .55 -2.32 .79
-0.15 .77 -1.87 .82
-0.71 .15 -6.73 .41
-0.14 .80 -13.42 .17  -0.12 .83 -12.23 .22 -0.58 .31 -14.69 .11 -0.09 .87 -14.89 .15  -0.48 .42  -6.02 .57
-0.23 .73 34.92*** .00  -0.44 .48 35.14*** .00 -0.30 .65 32.51*** .00 -0.14 .84 34.80*** .00  -0.24 .71  25.50** .04
 1.25*** .01  0.13 .99   1.28*** .00  -5.29 .57  1.33*** .00  -2.44 .79  1.18*** .01 -1.28 .88   1.33*** .00  -1.42 .85
-0.29 .54 43.80*** .00  -0.53 .22 49.46*** .00 -0.80* .06 47.23*** .00 -0.21 .59 48.22*** .00 -0.87* .05 43.50*** .00
99 52 99 52 99 52 99 52 99 52
- 0.06 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.01 - 0.00
- 0.22 - 0.21 - 0.25 - 0.21 - 0.30
0.09 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.21
- 23.96 - 24.20 - 23.56 - 24.18 - 22.42
  3.56 .17 -   1.87 .39 -   7.58** .02 -   3.12 .21 -   5.87* .05 -
0.70 - 0.69 - 0.71 - 0.69 - 0.71 -
- 27.10 - 26.11 - 25.14 - 27.11 - 25.11
2pmSoftDeterInvest = 0 SoftDeterInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftDeterInvest = SoftDeterInvest SoftDeterInvest > 10
 2pmToughAllowInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Aggression
Physical Aggression -0.17 .74 -11.88* .10
Verbal Aggression -0.63 .23  -8.83 .39
Anger  0.31 .57   5.05 .66
Hostility  0.03 .95  -1.23 .88
Assertiveness
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity -0.09 .86 -5.86 .45
Fairness  0.45 .36  0.86 .94
Greed Avoidence  0.42 .36 -0.79 .93
Modesty  0.53 .27 10.22 .28
Emotionality
Fearfulness  0.62 .20 -4.92 .58
Anxiety  0.25 .58 11.79 .19
Dependence -0.31 .55 -5.97 .50
Sentimentality -0.11 .82 -4.19 .69
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Patience
Conscientiousness
Organisation
Diligence
Perfectionism
Prudence
Openness-to-Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
Inquisitiveness
Creativity
Unconventionality
Gender (female)   0.12 .80  4.21 .65  -0.09 .87  -1.90 .87  0.00 .99   4.92 .56  -0.03 .95   8.51 .40
Consequences   1.28 .12 32.50*** .00   1.32 .14 35.95*** .00  1.39 .11 32.53*** .00   1.44 .10 33.87*** .00
Experiment experience   0.12 .78 -2.47 .76   0.07 .87  -2.93 .70  0.11 .79  -3.05 .71   0.11 .81   0.22 .98
constant  -0.02 .95 39.54*** .00   0.18 .68 44.72*** .00 -0.41 .32 37.74*** .00   0.22 .60 37.01*** .00
99 54 99 54 99 54 99 54
- 0.03 - 0.00 - 0.01 - 0.01
- 0.16 - 0.20 - 0.19 - 0.20
0.02 0.11 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.07
- 28.65 - 29.04 - 29.39 - 29.18
χ - -   1.67 .43 -   3.01 .22 -   2.07 .36 -
0.54 - 0.62 - 0.63 - 0.63 -
- 28.09 - 31.08 - 46.99 - 29.44
2pmSoftAllowInvest = 0 SoftAllowInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftAllowInvest = SoftAllowInvest SoftAllowInvest > 10
   
2pmToughAllowInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
-0.16 .75 -9.43 .25
 0.27 .53 -4.89 .53
-0.27 .56  3.15 .73
 0.66 .17 14.37* .08  0.71 .12 12.08 .14
 0.09 .85 -7.06 .34
 0.90* .07 -9.23 .36  0.98** .05 -10.85 .17
-0.84 .12 19.27* .06 -0.80 .11 11.11 .20
 0.34 .47 -8.62 .36
 0.02 .97 -1.57 .90
-0.02 .97 -5.10 .64
 0.41 .39 14.68 .23
 0.19 .71 -6.61 .38
 0.04 .94  4.87 .65
 0.03 .95  6.20 .51
-0.90 .06  3.49 .69
 0.40 .41  0.77 .92
-0.08 .87  8.15 .44
 0.07 .88  3.36 .66   0.47 .37  0.42 .95 -0.11 .84 -1.44 .88  0.20 .68  1.24 .88   0.41 .44  -1.02 .90
 1.29 .11 31.06*** .01   1.20 .14 32.75*** .00  1.41 .09 35.01*** .00  1.17 .18 35.79*** .00   1.19 .14 33.89*** .00
 0.20 .64  1.83 .81   0.13 .77 -3.18 .69  0.13 .76 -2.82 .75  0.19 .67 -2.20 .78   0.22 .61   1.62 .83
-0.37 .42 36.45*** .00  -0.25 .56 42.73*** .00 -0.26 .52 34.45*** .00  0.11 .79 34.63*** .00  -0.39 .43 36.45*** .00
99 54 99 54 99 54 99 54 99 54
- 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.06 - 0.00
- 0.23 - 0.25 - 0.21 - 0.18 - 0.28
0.04 0.11 0.06 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.17
- 28.62 - 28.19 - 29.03 - 29.42 - 27.57
  2.72 .26 -   5.54* .06 -   1.23 .54 -   3.95 .14 -   7.64** .02 -
0.63 - 0.66 - 0.60 - 0.66 - 0.68 -
- 30.53 - 29.44 - 30.65 - 30.63 - 28.72
2pmSoftAllowInvest = 0 SoftAllowInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftAllowInvest = SoftAllowInvest SoftAllowInvest > 10
 2pmToughDeterInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
Aggression
Physical Aggression -0.13 .80 -2.63 .91
Verbal Aggression  0.18 .74 -8.47 .66
Anger  0.01 .99  1.38 .95
Hostility -0.23 .63  0.63 .97
Assertiveness
Honesty-Humility
Sincerity  0.27 .62 -21.57 .23
Fairness  0.00 .99 10.97 .67
Greed Avoidence  0.22 .64  2.55 .89
Modesty  0.71 .15  5.38 .74
Emotionality
Fearfulness  0.27 .57  2.25 .90
Anxiety  0.10 .83 -1.20 .94
Dependence  0.11 .84  2.03 .90
Sentimentality -0.59 .30 28.55* .08
Extraversion
Social Self-Esteem
Social Boldness
Sociability
Liveliness
Agreeableness
Forgiveness
Gentleness
Flexibility
Patience
Conscientiousness
Organisation
Diligence
Perfectionism
Prudence
Openness-to-Experience
Aesthetic Appreciation
Inquisitiveness
Creativity
Unconventionality
Gender (female)   -1.41** .01 -19.31 .27  -1.44** .02 -20.81 .40  -1.52*** .01 -17.26 .53 -1.40** .01 -17.05 .40
Consequences    0.79 .32  -7.94 .64   0.85 .31 -8.28 .69   0.92 .26 -16.18 .44  0.99 .25 -22.48 .15
Experiment experience   -0.47 .29  13.62 .34  -0.47 .29 14.26 .34  -0.54 .24  14.99 .35 -0.44 .33 14.25 .33
constant    0.09 .79  70.59*** .00   0.16 .72 73.23*** .00  -0.24 .57 70.69*** .00  0.04 .93 65.20*** .00
99 40 99 67 99 67 99 1.4
0.06 0.30 - 0.70 - 0.71 - 0.24
- 0.06 - 0.06 - 0.10 - 0.11
0.06 -0.02 0.07 -0.14 0.09 -0.09 0.00 -0.08
- 45.41 - 47.97 - 46.90 - 46.67
χ - -   0.41 .82 -   3.40 .18 -   1.48 .48 -
0.64 - 0.66 - 0.67 - 0.65 -
- 46.93 - 51.32 - 55.34 - 51.24
2pmSoftDeterInvest = 0 SoftDeterInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftDeterInvest = SoftDeterInvest SoftDeterInvest > 10
   
2pmToughDeterInvest
β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p β p
 0.17 .73 28.52** .05  0.45 .88 23.41* .07
 0.03 .96 -22.15 .18
 0.98* .08   1.79 .91
-1.32** .01 21.47 .22 -1.10** .02 24.98* .06
 0.03 .96 -31.98** .03  0.59 .22 -27.16** .03
 0.85 .12  18.53 .16
 0.40 .42  12.15 .32
-0.48 .35  15.06 .46
-0.29 .62 -3.06 .90
 0.38 .43  7.41 .68
 0.26 .63 -21.57 .12
 0.02 .98 18.00 .38
-0.05 .92 36.55* .06
 0.77 .17 -32.04** .02
-0.92* .08  -3.37 .84
 0.54 .29  -6.57 .66
-1.55*** .01 -27.01 .10 -1.84*** .00 -30.88* .09 -1.60 .01 -18.97 .36 -1.51** .02 -22.20 .26  -1.22** .03 -30.08** .05
 0.84 .37 -12.10 .45  0.98 .21  9.79 .65  0.85 .27  -6.99 .71  0.77 .38 -24.47 .16
-0.18 .72  11.83 .44 -0.39 .38  5.27 .77 -0.44 .33   5.80 .73 -0.54 .27 29.05* .07
 0.12 .80 58.55*** .00 -0.18 .67 66.40*** .00 -0.09 .82 71.94*** .00  0.04 .93 70.10*** .00  0.14 .73 70.01*** .00
99 40 99 40 99 40 99 40 99 40
- 0.11 - 0.02 - 0.39 - 0.18 - 0.01
- 0.22 - 0.23 - 0.11 - 0.18 - 0.25
0.12 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.16
- 43.69 - 43.38 - 46.63 - 44.77 - 41.13
  7.82** .02 -   4.61* .10 -   1.18 .55 -   6.28** .04 -   4.23 .12 -
0.71 - 0.69 - 0.67 - 0.72 - 0.69 -
- 47.91 - 48.93 - 49.98 - 50.86 - 42.99
2pmSoftDeterInvest = 0 SoftDeterInvest ≤ 10 2pmSoftDeterInvest = SoftDeterInvest SoftDeterInvest > 10
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